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THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH AGING POLICY:
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CYCLICAL THEORY
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KENNETH J. BRANCO, MSW
Department of Sociology
Boston College

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the explanatory power
of
Piven
and
Cloward's
cyclical theory of
social
relief
through
an
exploration
of
policies in
England
from the twelfth through
the
nineteenth
century.
While
there
is
evidence of
a cyclical trend between restrictive
and
liberal policies in this period, we
find that
those shifts cannot consistently be
explained by
social
turmoil.
There
is also
evidence of
a
long-term
trend toward a more
restrictive aging
policy which is unaccounted
for by cyclical theory.
This
trend
can be
better explained by a
more basic set of ideas
uncerlying cyclical theory, i.e., the needs of
a capitalist economic system.

INTRODUCTION

In
their
classic work,
Regulating
the
PoQr , Piven and Cloward
(1971) argued
that
there
was
a
cyclical
relationship between
government relief policies and social protest.

The central theme of the cyclical theory
is
that when mass unemployment
led to civil
disorder, governments were compelled to calm
the masses through the provision of relief.
Conversely, when
rioting, looting
and other
forms
of
expressing
collective distress
subsided, governments
cut
back on
their
efforts to relieve poverty. During the latter
periods, a shell of the relief system was left
for the aged and other "impotents".
Piven and Cloward
contend
that
the
degrading manner
in which
these "impotents"
were treated is evidence
that the primary
function of
public welfare
in periods
of
social stability is to encourage those capable
of work
to
shun relief
and
"... to offer
themselves to any employer
on any terms"
(1971:34).
The
aged are thus viewed as
residual persons in the formulation of relief
policy.
The cyclical theory was and
is useful in
debunking the myth that social welfare efforts
are undertaken with solely humanitarian and
altruistic intent. Rather, relief efforts are
seen
as tools of social control.
Relief
is
utilized
by
elites,
as the
book
title
suggests, to
regulate
the poor in and out of
the labor market at wages favorable to owners,
while maintaining
the
public order necessary
for the conduct of profitable commerce.
We find
the Piven and Cloward
thesis
compelling.
If we look at the trajectory of
relief policy
in England
from the
twelfth
through
the nineteenth century, we see a
cyclical pattern. There
is clearly movement
between
more and
less
restrictive relief
policies.
However,
this model
leaves some
important evidence unexplained. For example,
there was a great deal of civil disorder that
directly preceded the Reform of
1834
(de
Schweinitz, 1943).
However, instead of liberalization, the response was a more restrictive

relief policy. It would seem that
for the
English
case,
a policy
of
repression was
preferred to a policy of liberalization.
There is also evidence of
a
long-term
trend
from a less restrictive old age relief
policy to a more restrictive policy. How do
we account
for
what
appears
to
be an
increasingly restrictive and harsh approach to
old age relief between
the twelfth and the
nineteenth
century? The
trend
cannot be
explained by a steady decline
in
social
disorder,
for
disorder rose and fell between
the twelfth and nineteenth century.
In fact,
even if there had been a steady decline
in
disorder, the Piven and
Cloward thesis would
not adequately explain a harsher treatment of
the aged.
Policy toward the
aged is correctly
treated as a residual phenomenon by Piven
and
Cloward.
However,
their
theory cannot adequately predict
if a rise in social disorder
which leads to liberalization of relief policy
toward
riotous
laborers
will
include
liberalization toward
the
aged,
or
to
restrictions on
the aged
in order that more
resources
be diverted to
the
troublesome
portions of the population. While a strong
case can be made for seeing policy toward the
aged as a residual phenomenon, cyclical theory
needs application and supplementation in order
to account for the treatment of the aged.
We believe that a more basic set of ideas
underlying the Piven and Cloward thesis can
better
explain the increasingly
restrictive
policies toward the aged, i.e., the transition
from a feudal to a market
economy and
the
needs of a capitalist economy. In this paper,
we shall view the effects of the transition on
policy toward the aged by examining
five
policy periods in English history. They are:
1.

Medieval

Relief

Policy prior to the

2.
3.
4.
5.

14th Century.
The
14th
century
Statutes
of
Laborers.
16th and 17th century Relief Policy.
18th century Relief Policy.
Poor Law Reform in the 19th century.

Through
this approach, we shall seek
explanation of both the residual effects
the aged of policies directed primarily
other groups as well as an explanation
restrictive policies toward the aged.
MEDIEVAL
CENTURY

RELIEF

PRIOR

POLICY

TO

THE

an
on
at
of

14TH

As
early
as
the
6th century, the
Christian church was actively involved in poor
relief through
its system of largely rural
monasteries (Webb and Webb, 1972).
But it is
not until 1140 with the codification of Church
law in the DECRETUM that we have a
thorough
statement of medieval church law concerning
poor relief
(Tierney, 1959).
Relief policy
did
vary from one feudal estate to
another,
but it was relatively stable from the twelfth
through the middle of the fourteenth century.
Church
policy
toward
the poor was
virtually the only public policy for this
period of
more
than
two hundred years
(Cipolla, 1976).
Everyone was a member of the
Church and potentially eligible for relief.
The Crown and feudal lords viewed relief as a
Church function.
The Church had
its own
ecclesiastical tax,
the tithe, to finance its
relief efforts. Based on the DECRETUM medieval
canonists argued that the poor had a right to
relief and those who were better off had the
obligation to provide it (Coll, 1969).
The Church's position was that some were
born rich and some

were

4

born

poor.

Poverty

was seen as part of God's design, not as a
reflection
of personal failure or
moral
turpitude.
The existence of poverty provided
an opportunity for the well-off to demonstrate
Christian charity.
This morality was not separate from the
economic institutions of
Medieval Europe.
Because medieval serfs were tied to the land,
they were economic assets to the feudal lord.
He had a clear economic interest in keeping
his serfs in good health so that they would be
able to work the land. Thus, he could be
expected to participate in relief efforts in
times of need, often by providing food or
money to the parish church for distribution
(de Schweinitz, 1943).
Medieval relief policy toward the aged
poor was
not sharply differentiated from
policy toward other dependent categories such
as the blind or disabled.
Under ordinary
circumstances not much was
made
of the
distinction between the infirm elderly poor
and the able-bodied poor. In the extended
family system of the time such distinctions
were impractical under normal circumstances,
and further, there was very little involuntary
un-employment in the modern sense of the term.
However, in the DECRETUM distinctions were
made that were to be used when resources for
relief were limited. In such situations the
"impotent" (infirm) elderly were to be given a
higher priority than the able-bodied (Tierney,
1959; Coll, 1969).
In the medieval period
then, there is evidence that policy toward the
aged was less restrictive. This is not to say
that being an impoverished aged peasant is a
social status that one would aspire to. It
does however suggest that those in control of
the feudal economy had both a moral and an
economic stake in a benevolent stance toward
the aged poor.

THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY STATUTES OF

LABORERS

During
the
late Middle Ages, the feudal
social order began to disintegrate.
By
1350
only fifty
percent
of the English population
were serfs (Coulton, 1925).
The rise of towns
and the development of an international market
for English
woolen
cloth
contributed to the
change.
So
did
the shift from sharecropping
and
feudal
services
to
a
system of
cash
payments (Bennett, 1937).
This emergence of a
money economy provided
a
means
for serfs to
buy their freedom and created job pportunities
for those
able to escape bondage.
In England
the breakdown of
the feudal order was well on
its
way
by
the
mid-fourteenth
century
(Coulton, 1925; Tierney, 1959).
In
1348
the
bubonic
plague
reached
England
causing
a
sharp reduction
in
population which turned out to have some positive
consequences for the peasants who survived (de
Schweinitz,
1943).
The
shortage
of
labor
dramatically
drove
up
wages
which in
turn
accelerated
the
long-term
social
changes
associated with
the decline of feudalism that
were already
in
process.
It became increasingly easy
and
attractive
to escape bondage
for work
as
an
artisan in town or as a free
laborer on
another
estate
(Coulton, 1925).
Strong economic incentives encouraged laborers
to move from one region to
another
in search
of
higher
paying
jobs.
Between
jobs, many
turned to begging.
Some
joined vagrant bands
which
led
to
an
increase
in
thievery and
banditry (Coll, 1969).
The response was a major shift in
public
relief policy
coming
with the enactment of a
series of laws referred to as
The Statutes of
Laborers
between
1349
and
1388
(Nicholls,
1898; Leonard, 1900).
These laws
were
primarily
designed
to
deal
with
the
social
disorder caused
by
a
sharp
increase in the

of
marauding bands
of labor and
movement
beggars.
The 1388 statute prohibited begging
infirm
by the
able-bodied. Begging
by the
elderly, the blind, or disabled was permitted,
at their place of
it were done
but only if
current residence.
The Statutes of Laborers were basically
repressive measures designed
to control the
geographic mobility, wage demands, vagrancy,
The motive for
and begging of the peasants.
this first instance of
state
regulation of
begging was in no sense a humanitarian concern
for the plight
of destitute beggars. The
legislation would not have been enacted if
most beggars had been disabled, blind, or
force the ableelderly.
The
goal was to
bodied to work at "reasonable" wages.
These
statutes were not
successful in
eliminating begging by the
able-bodied, but
they did help elderly beggars by reducing the
competition. The statutes had another serendipitous
consequence:
children were discouraged
from leaving the local area and as
a
result were more
likely to be available to
provide help to elderly parents.
The fourteenth century s important in our
analysis since
it marks the first occasion of
state
intrusion into
relief policy. It
is
also
important
in the
context of
cyclical
theory. Here we have an
instance of social
disorder which
is met with repression rather
relief policy. How do
than liberalization of
we reconcile that fact with cyclical theory:
which suggests that
liberalization follows
disorder?
If we keep in mind the more basic
theme of a transition to a market economy and
is a logical
wage labor, then repression
solution in this instance. The plague created
a shortage of laborers. Liberalization would
only be useful policy to elites if there were
many more laborers than the economy could
absorb at low wages.

Just as
in earlier periods in English
history, the aged escaped the stigmatization
of having to beg illegally. There were too
few of
them to pose any serious threat to the
emerging market economy.
There was still no
need for specific mechanisms of social control
of
the aged.
Simply left
to beg on
the
streets, they served adequate examples of the
virtues of toil.
16TH AND 17TH CENTURY POOR LAW
During the
fifteenth century, economic
conditions
were generally
favorable
for
peasants
throughout Europe
(Coulton, 1925;
Braudel, 1967).
The sixteenth century,
in
contrast,
brought a marked deterioration in economic
conditions for
the
laboring class
(Oxley,
1974).
A number of
factors contributed to
this change, but of particular importance was
increased dependence on a market economy due
to the growth of the international market for
English woolen cloth and the related
trend
toward the enclosure of land for sheep herding
(Webb and Webb, 1927).
The evolving market
economy was making
the nation increasingly
vulnerable to the vicissitudes
of
international markets and the
cyclical trends of
capitalist economies. This
lead to
a sharp
increase in the number of vagrants and beggars
which contributed to an upswing
in
social
disorder, crime, and food
riots
(Webb and
Webb, 1927; Hampson, 1934).
Something had to be
done to maintain
social order.
Cyclical theory would predict a
liberalization of
relief, but
this did not
occur. The first attempts were similar to the
fourteenth century Statutes
of
Laborers.
Their emphasis was on the
suppression of

the able bodied
begging, particularly by
The first statute passed, the
(Ashley, 1883).
of 1531, called for public whipping
Poor Law
beggars. The "impotent",
of all able-bodied
for
apply
could
including the elderly,
1536
Law of
The Poor
permission to beg.
by the
even
entirely prohibited begging,
for begging began
infirm elderly. Penalties
if deemed
with whipping and branding and
(de Schweinitz,
execution
necessary included
1943).
enacted between
Poor Law statutes
The
in the com1576 were synthesized
1531 and
minor
1597. With
of
statute
prehensive
Elizabethan Poor Law
changes this became the
English relief
for
the foundation
of 1601,
two hundred years
policy during the next
The Poor Law of 1601 called
(Leonard, 1900).
for a poor tax to generate the revenues needed
to provide relief. The poor were divided into
three categories: (1) children, (2) the ableDifferent
impotent.
(3) the
and
bodied,
were suggested for each. The ablepolicies
bodied were not denied relief so long as they
provided by poor
were willing to accept work
relief officials.
in response
enacted
The legislation was
to continuing food riots, looting and other
was
Begging
property.
against
crimes
who
beggars
and able-bodied
prohibited,
Relief
refused to work were sent to jail.
be closely linked to
policy continued to
workers but
concerns about social control of
nothing simple and direct about the
there was
relationship between riot and relief.
Had all of the poor been infirm, elderly,
is likely that their
blind, or disabled, it
destitution would have gone all but unnoticed.
This legislation was designed primarily as a
way to control the able-bodied. They were the
likely and most able to turn to the
ones most
that threatened the
violence and destruction

interests of property owners. The
elderly
were
included
in this legislation, bu they
were not the focus. Children were required to
provide
for
their elderly parents (Webb and
Webb, 1927),
and those aged without children
were provided for at home or in the alms house
(Leonard, 1900).
This more liberal
legislation was aimed
at the creation of the more
docile class of
laborers
required by the
developing market economy.
At other times repression
served that
goal best, as with the Law of Settlement and
Removal enacted in 1662 (Henric ues, 1979).
It
was a response
to labor
mobility and the
desire of taxpayers
in one area to avoid
paying relief for
recent migrants from other
areas (Webb and Webb, 1927).
Public officials
were given
the right to make recent migrants
leave the parish if it seemed likely that they
would become public dependents. Such persons
were required
to return
to their parish of
legal settlement (de Schweinitz, 1943).
The Law of
Settlement and Removal
had
particularly adverse consequences
for
older
laborers.
The older, less productive workers
had to search longer and further for employers
when the market was tight.
They were also
viewed as potential dependents and thus were
more
vulnerable than were younger workers to
the provisions of the statute. The
most
important
aspect of this
act
is that
it
signals a shift toward a more restrictive
policy toward the poor.
It is indicative of a
generally more punitive policy that
characterized the period from the mid-seventeenth
century to the late eighteenth century.
One factor contributing to this shift in
attitude
and
policy
was
the Protestant
Reformation. The Puritans
and other
sects
inspired by Calvinistic ideology were becoming
popular particularly among merchants, craftsmen,
and small land
holders
(de Beauvoir,

on
thrift,
stress
The
Calvinist
1972).
the
well with
fit
industry, and sobriety
entrepreneurial orientation of the growing and
(Coll,
increasingly influential middle class
preof
Calvinist conception
The
1969).
destination was also important as it lead to
signs that one had been
search for
the
selected for salvation; economic success was
These
such sign (Weber, 1958).
one
taken as
values led to the practice of blaming the poor
for their poverty and blaming the elderly for
made an
in not having
improvidence
their
live on during
effort to accumulate assets to
the later years.
18TH CENTURY RELIEF POLICY
was passed which
1722 a statute
In
into the
required that all recipients move
for relief. Thus
as precondition
workhouse
all who sought relief, the elderly as well as
subjected to the
the able-bodied, were to be
autonomy,
of
loss
stigma,
indignity,
control associated
regimentation, and social
with such institutions. One goal was to make
that only those who
relief so unattractive
were truly needy would apply; another was to
provide that relief which was necessary at the
(de Schweinitz,
expense
minimum possible
1943).
not
repressive measures would
These
late eighteenth century
persist however. The
was a period of mass unemployment, outbreaks
In keeping
of violence, and social disorder.
was
disruption
this
theory,
with cyclical
followed by liberalization.
In 1782 with the enactment of the Gilbert
of 1722 was neutralized
the Statute
Act,
On the surface it appears that
(Rose, 1971).
successful in their
reformers were
social
It was
efforts to discredit the workhouses.

the
very high infant mortality rates rather
than the often squalid conditions which many
of the elderly were subjected to that proved
most persuasive to
members of Parliament (de
Schweinitz, 1943).
The poor would no longer
be
required to
enter the workhouse as a
precondition for
relief. That these reforms
were more
in the keeping with a goal of
quieting
the
violent
masses
rather
than
improving the
care
of
the
impotent
is
evidenced by the fact that the workhouses were
not closed. They continued to operate
"on
behalf" of
the aged,
sick, infirm, orphan
children, or
children with their mothers.
They were simply off-limits to
the ablebodied, who were to be more carefully treated
(Webb and Webb, 1927).
Liberalization toward the able-bodied continued when
in 1795 Parliament approved a
system of wage supplements referred to as the
Speenhamland system. The most radical aspect
of
this
new policy
is that
it did not
discourage the
able-bodied
from
seeking
relief;
to the contrary, it made relief more
or less automatic with none of the stigma of
the workhouse (Polanyi, 1944).
At first the impact of the Speenhamland
system on the elderly poor was positive.
It
made up the difference between what the worker
was able to earn
and what was needed for
subsistence.
Thus
older,
less productive
workers could
remain
in the labor
force
longer.
But eventually the system severely
depressed wages and ceased to adequately make
up
the difference between wages paid and
subsistence
(Polanyi, 1944).
Older
workers
were
becoming
a
part
of
the
economic
underclass
required by the further developed
market economy.
POOR LAW REFORM IN THE 19TH CENTURY

The
liberalization of relief
policy
during
the
late eighteenth century
was
reversed with the enactment of the Poor Law
Reform of
1834
(Rose,
1971).
The most
important policy change was that able-bodied
applicants were once again required to enter
the workhouse as a condition for the receipt
of relief. The condition of those on relief
was no less desirable ("less eligible") than
that of the lowest paid laborers not on relief
(Webb and Webb, 1910).
The goal was to avoid
making the workhouse an attractive option for
able-bodied laborers working at low wages.
This restrictive shift affected agricultural workers who were often discriminated
against. Long before a worker was in any
obvious way disabled by the infirmities of old
age, he became less productive and thus less
attractive to employers than younger workers.
These landless older agricultural workers were
often forced into beggary of the workhouse.
As they were not suffering from the infirmities of extreme old age, for purposes of
relief they were classified as able-bodied.
Not only these workers,
but
also their
dependents were forced
to make a choice
between the workhouse and starvation.
This new legislation did not call for any
change in Poor Law provisions dealing with the
infirm elderly (Webb and Webb, 1910).
But it
did have the effect of increasing the proportion of the elderly who ended up in the
workhouse.
One reason was that the legislation was part of a more general shift in the
direction of harsher attitudes and policies
toward the poor (de Schweinitz, 1943; Polanyi,
1944; Coll, 1969). All categories of the poor
including the infirm elderly were more likely
to be blamed and held in contempt for being
paupers. Local poor relief authorities had a
great deal of discretion in the implementation
of poor relief policy. This shift in attitude

toward the poor
made even
the elderly poor
vulnerable to these more restrictive policies.
In many areas the workhouse became the choice
of first rather than last resort not only for
the able-bodied, but also for the elderly and
other
impotent categories
(Webb and Webb,
1929).
A major stimulus to the enactment of the
1834 Reform was the rapid increase
in poor
taxes since the turn of the century (Webb and
Webb, 1927; de Schweinitz, 1943).
During this
same period there was a marked increase in the
number of persons
on relief, particularly in
areas
which had implemented the Speenhamland
system
(Hammond
and
Hammond, 1910).
The
conclusion reached by many policy makers (and
taxpayers) was that
the liberal Speenhamland
system was causing pauperization (Coll, 1969).
Tax monies could be saved and the able-bodied
could be
saved from a life of dependency, if
only a more restrictive relief policy were
implemented.
There was considerable social
disorder in this period, and this restrictive
shift is clearly not accounted for by cyclical
theory.
If the elderly were required to move into
the workhouse, this would provide a strong
incentive to
find some alternative means of
subsistence.
Some would do without, some
would turn to
their children, and some would
find yet
other
ways
to avoid
institutionalization.
It would
also
provide an
incentive to children both to support their
elderly parents and to set aside funds for
their
own old age
(Webb and Webb, 1929).
Under these conditions people will work longer
hours
for
less
compensation. That
is
precisely what was required by the owners of
the Industrial Revolution.

CONCLUSIONS

long-term trend in poor
Looking
at the
England
from the twelfth
for
relief policy
through the nineteenth century, the pattern is
clearly cyclical. The most useful theoretical
account of
this pattern is that proposed by
to their
According
Piven and Cloward (1971).
unemployment
leads to
mass
account when
elites
ruling
disorder,
outbreaks of civil
a mechanism of
expand relief programs as
social control designed to restore political
stability. In the English case there is much
to support this
interpretation of
evidence
efforts. It
fits well with the
poor relief
relief
policies during the
liberalization of
(the Elizabethan
early seventeenth century
Poor Law) and the late eighteenth century (the
Speenhamland System).
of major
But
there are also a number
policy shifts that are not explained by their
have
seen, the theory needs
model.
As we
amplification in order to explain the punitive
civil disorder during the fourresponse to
teenth century
(the Statutes of Laborers) and
the early sixteenth century (the early Poor
It also does not adequately
Law statutes).
the
Poor law Reform of 1834 which
deal with
to
was a distinctively restrictive response
the civil disorder and turmoil of the era.
It would seem that for the English case a
generally preferred
policy of repression was
A policy of
to a policy of liberalization.
resorted to
liberalization was an alternative
when repression alone would not restore social
trend
to the cyclical
In addition
order.
liberal and more restrictive
between more
relief policies, there was also a long-term
less restrictive old age relief
from
trend
policies to more restrictive policies.
restrictive
for more
possibility
One
policy would be a long-term trend toward a

harsher
population. Were
elderly
larger
policies needed as the proportion who were old
for
estimates
structure
increased? Age
1841 are only available for
England prior to
there is sufficient
selected
villages, but
evidence to conclude that there was little if
of
elderly
in the proportion
any increase
between the sixteenth
and middle of
the
nineteenth century
(Laslett, 1976).
Similarly, we have no reason to believe that there
was any increase in the proportion of elderly
from
the
twelfth
through
the sixteenth
century. It is unlikely that changed
in age
structure are responsible for the
long-term
trend toward harsher policies.
We have argued in this paper
that
the
restrictive trend can better be explained by
the development
of a market economy. In the
Middle Ages the market economy was
just
starting to emerge and it had not advanced to
the point at which it was having a significant
impact on
relief policy. Much more influential was the ideology of the Church which
viewed poverty as part of God's design and as
an
opportunity to
demonstrate
Christian
Charity (Marshall, 1926).
It was not a sign
of personal
failure, a crime, or a sign of
immorality. Begging and voluntary poverty had
distinguished Church heritage (de Schweinitz,
1943).
The
feudal manor was largely selfsufficient; neither the serfs nor
the lords
were attempting to respond
to outside market
demands.
The relationship between serf and
lord was based on an exchange, albeit one that
much favored the lord.
Because serfs were
needed to work the land and often difficult to
replace, the lord had an economic interest in
the health and well-being of his serfs.
By the early seventeenth century the more
developed market
economy
was
having
a
significant effect on poor
relief
policy.
Dobb
(1963) has argued that the late 16th and
early 17th century marks the opening phase of

In this period, laborcapitalism in England.
like any other
commodity
a
become
has
power
exchange. That transformation is
article of
crucial in understanding both the history of
capitalism and the history of relief. In the
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, the able-bodied
They
were put in a distinct relief category.
relief unless they were
were not to be given
the market
cycles of
willing to work. The
economy were contributing to periodic problems
of large scale unemployment. As an increasing
into
proportion of the population were drawn
more people became
economy,
market
the
resulting
cycles. The
to these
vulnerable
more than Church relief
mass unemployment was
A public relief
could handle (Leonard, 1900).
system based on a compulsory poor tax offered
an alternative approach more consistent with
the early sevenof
the economic realities
of mercanera
teenth century. During this
of the
concern
tilism, markets became a
government but there was little awareness of
the influence that markets would soon exert
over all spheres of social life. The idea of
not yet
was
economy
self-regulating
a
(Polanyi, 1944), but
affecting public policy
there had been a sharp increase in the portion
of production carried out by wage earners
hired by capitalists (Dobb, 1963).
was
1834
Reform of
Law
Poor
The
formulated at a time when England had a fully
developed market economy. The Reform of 1834
reflected the
its policy consequences
and
the self-regulating economy.
of
priorities
a total end to
not call for
While it did
some
government involvement in poor relief as
(de
suggesting
were
advocates
laissez-faire
represent the
did
it
1943),
Schweinitz,
possible at the
minimum public poor relief
time given the need to maintain social order.
now intentionally made stigmaRelief was
to discourage all
tizing and degrading so as
but the "truly needy" from becoming paupers
to be
Relief had come
(public dependents).

viewed as at best a necessary evil that
represented an undesirable reduction in the
Many of
economic return due the industrious.
the infirm elderly and many older workers had
no choice but to accept these indignities as
the price for a meager subsistence.
in
changes
These nineteenth century
imperatives of
reflected the
relief policy
fully developed competitive capitalism. The
industrial revolution and the emergence of the
factory system led to a situation in which the
capitalist mode of prod-uction moved from
being important to the productive process to a
dominance. Virtually the
position of total
entire economy was now based on work relations
between capitalists and wage earners (Dobb,
Large-scale factory production severed
1963).
laboring
what
little remaining hold the
producer had on the means of production. The
creation of a class wholly dependent on wage
labor was complete.
Efforts to minimize relief and minimizc
the consumption of unproductive groups such as
the elderly poor were entirely consistent with
an economy dominated by competitive capitalism. Social legislation was now clearly aimed
the
social
relations
of
at
supporting
production in capitalism. The right of owners
to appropriate the products of laborers was
well
established in law and custom.
So too
was an
ideology that
asserted the moral
in
superiority of
the
wealthy. Whereas
Medieval Europe Holiness
was gained through
acts of charity, in
19th century England
accumulation was seen as a sign of salvation.
Those who were most successful in "taking"
became defined as the greatest "givers" in the
Those who "gave" the
capitalist social order.
products of
their labors and were
therefore
in old age or
unable to support themselves
periods of unemployment became defined as the
social legisimmoral "takers. No piece of
since
that
time
has
seriously
lation

challenged
that ideology
relations that it supports.

or

the

social

REFERENCES

Ashley, Sir W. J.
1893
An___Introduction
to _Bgjj b
Economic History and Theory. Vol.
II,
2nd edition. London: Longmans, Green.
Bennett, H. S.
1937
Life on the _nglish Manor.
York:
Macmillan.
Blaug, M.
1963

1964

Bloch, M.
1961

New

"The Myth of the Old Poor Law and
the Making of the New", jurnilof
Economic History, 23, 151-184.
"The
Poor
Journal of
229-245.

law

nom-

Re-examined",
Hlisry, 24,

Feudal
Soty. 2
vols. Translated by L. A. Manyon. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

Braudel, F.
Capitais
_-and
MateralLif-e."
1967
M.
by
1400800. Translated
Kochan.
London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson.
Cipolla, C. M.
Before the Industrial Revolution.
1976
New York: W. W. Norton.
Coll, B. D.

1969

.
Perspectives inL__ublic-Wf
Washington, D. C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.

Coulton, G. G.
1925
The Medieval Village.
Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
de Beauvoir, S.
1972
The ComingoLAg.
P.
O'Brian. New
Putnams Sons

Translated by
York:
G.
P.

de Schweinitz, K.
1943
England's Road To Social Security.
Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Dobb, M.
1963

Studiz
in__the DevelQvmentof
Caitism. Revised edition. New
York: International Publishers.

Gray, B. K.
A
1905

itoyof EnglishPhilanthropy.
London: P.S. King.

Hammond, J. L. and B. Hammond
1911
The
Village
Labourer.

London:

Longmans, Green.
Hampson, E. M.
1934
The-Trfeatment

QLfLPovertyin
Cambridgeshire __1597-i834. Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press.

Henriques, U. R. Q.
1979
Before The Welfare State* __Q5oi
Administration in Early Industrial
Britain. New York:
Longman.
Jordon, W. K.
1959
PhilantjDj4in England 1480-1660.
London:
Allen and Unwin.

1961

The

Charitieso __RuL __Englan

1480-1660.
Sage.

New

York:

Russel

Laslett, P.
"Societal
1976

Development
and Aging"
in R.
H.
Binstock and E. Shanas,
(eds.), Handbook
of Aging and the
a
. New
York:
Nostrand Reinhold, 87-116.

Van

Leonard, E. M.
1900
The

Erly History of English Poor
Relief.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press.

Marshall, D.
The
1926

English

Poor

in

Law

Century.

the

London:

Routledge.

i
Nicholls, S:.r G.
1989
AHistory__ofthe
Laws.

O'Neill, K.
1984

English

New edition.

Vol

924 to 1714.

London:

E.
Family

Farm

Irlad:

and

The___

in

Oxley, G. W.
1974
Poor Relief

P.S. King.

Pre-Famine

Parsh-

Killashandra.
Madison:
of Wisconsin Press.

Poor

I, A.D.

o

University

in England and Wales
London: David
and

Charles

Polanyi, K.
The
Great
Transformation.
1944
York: Rinehart.
Piven, F. F. and R. A. Cloward
1972
ga
in IThe
_
o.

New

New

York:

Vintage.
Rose, M. E.
1966

Rose, M.

"The Allowance
System Under The
New Poor
Law".
Econmic- Histor
Review, 19, 607-620.

E.

TheEngish PrMLaw AM-1930.

1971

New York:
Sweezy, P.
1976

Barnes and Nobel.

"A Critique" in R.
Hilton, ed.,
Transition From Feudalism To
Capili.m.
London:
Verso, 3356.

T

Tierney, B
1959

M
i
l_Poor La.
Berkeley:
University of California Press.

Trattner, W • I.
From Poor LawTo Welfare State.
1974
New York:
Free Press.
Weber, M.
1958

The
Protestant
_Ethic-nd h
Sirit Of
ilism. Translated
by
T.
Parsons. New
York:
Scribner's.

Webb, S. and B. Webb
1910
English Poor
Law
-Policy.
York:
Longmans, Green.

New

1927

EnglshPoor Law History: Part-I.
The9 Qld
PoLur.
New York:
Longmans, Green.

1929

Bglishi-Poor Law History:
Last Hundred Years. Vol. I.
York: Longmans, Green.

The
New

